

<https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21225828>

Religion, Personality Politics, and Issue Voting in Peripheral Pakistan: Explaining the Divergent Electoral Behavior of District Lakki Marwat in the 2018 General Elections

Atiq Ur Rehman	Ph.D Scholar, Department of Pakistan Study, Islamia College University Peshawar atiqu235@gmail.com
Dr. Noor ul Amin	Chairman Department of Pakistan Study Islamia College University Peshawar noorulamin@icp.edu.pk

Abstract: *In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) swept the entire province in the 2018 General Elections, except the district of Lakki Marwat in the southern belt of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa where the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F) kept its National Assembly seat and two of its three provincial assembly seats. This article examines the reasons for the consistent voting patterns of Lakki Marwat (LM) in the three elections of 2008, 2013 and 2018, contrary to the provincial trends. The study examines the explanatory power of four theories of voting behavior (party identification, issue voting, religious voting, and personality or candidate-centered voting) in a rural, conservative Pakhtun district, based on an institutionalized, structured survey of voters (N = 1,122), an additional attitudinal survey component (N = 613), interviews with sitting and retired members of parliament, and election results from the district level for the period of 1988-2018. Chi-square analyses show that there are statistically significant relationships between vote motivation and gender, age, profession, income, education and region. Three things are noteworthy. First, religion is a strong determinant: for respondents in the south, the desire for an 'Islamic system' is the second most important single factor, and the religious parties' network of madrassas and mosques translates religiosity into lasting partisanship. Second, electoral competition is structured around a few dynastic families—in particular the Saifullah brothers—who through their patronage, offer of jobs and involvement in communal rituals (gham-khadi) elicit personality-based voting across party lines. Thirdly, issue voting is of a hyper local and clientelistic nature based on water, electricity and vote buying etc., and not based on programme oriented issues at the national level. The article suggests that in Lakki Marwat religious voting and personality voting have combined to dampen party-identification and programmatic-issue dynamics, which reshaped the rest of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2013 and 2018, and it has implications for the study of electoral behaviour in Pakistan's peripheral districts.*

Keywords: voting behaviour; Pakistan; Khyber Pakhtunkhwa; Lakki Marwat; religious voting; JUI-F; personality politics; issue voting; clientelism; 2018 General Elections

1. Introduction

The core of the democratic citizenship is voting. The ballot gives ordinary people a say in who they like best among candidates, parties and political systems, and elections provide in turn a measure of legitimacy to those who govern (Jost, 2006). An understanding of the determinants of the votes of specific groups of voters - the study of voting behaviour - is thus central in political science. Several

scholars have made the distinction between long-term factors and short-term factors affecting the vote: Long-term factors include social class, religion, ethnicity, age, education and final partisan allegiance; short-term factors include government performance, salient issues, campaign dynamics, images of the candidates, and major political events (Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960; Fiorina, 1981). How these factors interact and which ones are strongest or weaker depend greatly on the nature of the political system and the extent to which the models developed for consolidated Western democracies will translate in electoral systems with weak parties, dynastic elites, and clientelistic exchange (Wilder, 1999).

The situation of Pakistan is exactly like that one. It has a history of military interventions, non-party elections, charges of electoral fraud and several instances of constitutional engineering that have adversely affected the institutionalisation of party competition (Waseem, 1994; Khan, 2009). In Pakistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has been an anomaly with regards to election results as the religious alliance Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) swept the province in 2002, the secular-nationalist Awami National Party (ANP) formed the government after 2008, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) swept the province in 2013 on a “change” platform, and then, uniquely in the province's history, was re-elected with an enlarged majority in 2018. On this reading, the voters of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in the 2013 and 2018 elections have departed from religious and ethnic voting and moved towards performance and change oriented voting.

District Lakki Marwat remained untouched from their way. In the last three general elections (2008, 2013 and 2018), a few families have been active in the district that were able to control the national and provincial constituencies of the district through Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F) and their own candidates. During the PTI wave in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2013, JUI-F had won all the three seats of the provincial assembly and its chief Maulana Fazlur Rehman had won the National Assembly seat of Lakki Marwat. Despite the PTI's two-thirds provincial majority in 2018, the JUI-F had won the district's National Assembly seat (NA-36), two of the three provincial seats (PK-91 and PK-93) and only lost PK-92 to the PTI. This continued disjuncture raises the empirical question which impelled this study: What is the reason for consistent difference in the voting behaviour of District Lakki Marwat as compared to other districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa?

There is not much literature directly applicable to guidance. Previous research on the voting behavior in Pakistan has focused almost exclusively on Punjab (Wilder, 1999; Anwar, 2016) and on Khyber Pakhtunkhwa as a whole (Ahmad, 2010a; Ullah, 2014); and the little work done on the district level has not covered the southern districts where religious parties continue to be strongest. The purpose of this article is to fill this void. It pursues three research questions. Firstly, how much is electoral behaviour influenced by religion in District Lakki Marwat? Second, what actually are the voters in the district basing their voting decisions on? Third, how does these voting behavior affect the district's politics?

To address these questions, the study draws on four sources of evidence: a structured survey of voters conducted around the 2018 General Elections (N = 1122); an attitudinal survey of the ulema on the political role of the ulema and the performance of religious parties (N = 613); semi-structured interviews with 15 incumbent and former legislators, party officials, and local personalities; and detailed election results for the district's national and provincial seats over the last eight general elections from 1988 to 2018. The article provides analytically an evaluation of the applicability of four different canonical models of voting behaviour – party identification (Campbell et al., 1960), issue voting (Downs, 1957; Rabinowitz & Macdonald, 1989), religious-cleavage voting (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967; Lijphart, 1979), and personality or candidate-centred voting (Caprara & Zimbardo, 2004) – in the context of a rural, conservative, tribally organised Pakhtun-dominated district.

The argument in short is that it is the mutually reinforcing workings of religious voting and personality voting which give rise to divergence in Lakki Marwat. A small group of dynastic families, most

importantly the Saifullah brothers, but also the Meena Khel, Maidad Khel, Ahmad Khel and Begu Khel families, structure competition around persons, not programmes, and the JUI-F's extensive network of madrassas, mosques and locally entrenched ulema translates the district's high religiosity into enduring electoral support. Although it is a reality, the voting is hyper local and clientelistic: votes are purchased and won by providing water pumps, electricity transformers and employment. Such an atmosphere does not provide much traction for the party-identification and programmatic dynamics that have propelled the PTI throughout the rest of the province.

The following is a continuation of the article. The literature on voting behaviour in Pakistan is discussed in Section 2. In Section 3 the theoretical framework is developed. The data and methods are described in Section 4. The study area is described in Section 5. The district's electoral history from 1988-2018 is reconstructed in Section 6. The empirical results of religion, personality and issues are provided in Sections 7 – 9. The findings are discussed in Section 10 and the conclusions are in Section 11.

2. Literature Review

The scholarly literature on electoral behaviour in Pakistan is increasing and still it is not even in terms of geography and in terms of themes as well. The starting point is Wilder's (1999) article on the Punjabi voter, which focused on the factors that influenced the voting process in the 1993 elections and, in contrast to the dominant feudalism/kinship perspective of the time, suggested that clientelism is operating in rural constituencies and party-based voting in urban ones. Most work since then has been in the context of Wilder's list of social determinants of the Pakistani vote: gender, class, age, education, religion, factionalism, and biradari (kinship-group). Anwar (2016) continued the biradari analysis to the politics at the village level in Dera Ghazi Khan and earlier to Ahmed (2004) who analyzed the impact of biradarism on the politics of Faisalabad Division in Punjab.

The second stream is about the structural and institutional environment of Pakistani elections. Later, Waseem (1994) gave a structural explanation of the 1993 elections in which the focus was on the campaign as the key player in the political arena, and the necessity for continuous electoral reform was highlighted; and in his later work he analysed the manipulated elections of 2002 under General Musharraf (Waseem, 2006). Sayeed (1967) placed the electoral politics in a wider context of the Pakistan movement and the political structure created after independence, the role of Islam and the Basic Democracies experiment, while Baxter and Kennedy (1998) discussed the political crisis of 1997, Thirteenth Amendment and the conflict between government and judiciary. Haider (2002) gathered comprehensive national and provincial assembly data and the legal documents (Provisional Constitution Order, 1999 and Legal Framework Order, 2002) under which the Musharraf regime re-structured electoral competition. Shafqat (2007) collected and collated the European and Pakistani evaluation of Pakistan as a complex and diverse polity grappling with constraints and missed opportunities time and again.

The third stream is particular to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. After the recent 1985 non-party elections, Khan (1986) conducted a study on voting behaviour in the rural areas of the North-West Frontier Province, which mainly relied on the opinions of the provincial assembly members. Ahmad (2010a) analysed electoral politics in the province over the four elections between 1988 and 1999 and questioned the notion of social determinants as the dominant factor and proposed that it is a dynamic process that changes with the passage of time and the changing nature of issues. Shah (2013) provided a district level case study of Charsadda in the 2008 elections and Ullah (2014a) has analysed the partisans and floating voters in the province in the 2013 elections. Research conducted on the post-2001 years has noted the impact of the war on terror on the province through elections (Ahmad, 2010b) and also noted the constraints of the militant violence on the party campaigning most notably, the targeting of ANP by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (Khan, 2015).

The fourth stream is that of the politics of Pakistan's religious parties. Ullah's (2014b) study on Islamic

parties has recorded their organisational strategies, vote-share, and political violence association and provided the province level and national vote-share series below. Zaman (2002), Pirzada (2000), and Kizilbash (1988) explored the history and politics of both the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam and the Deobandi scholarly world, and the source of anti-Americanism in Pakistani society, respectively; and all three found the MMA and the Deobandi community in general to be deeply rooted in anti-American sentiments.

One thing these literature pieces lack is a focus on the southern districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Lakki Marwat, Bannu, Tank, and Dera Ismail Khan – where the religious parties have been the most resilient and where the waves of 2013 and 2018 have been the least violent. Some of the existing accounts either combine the province or so mask intra-provincial differences, or they are restricted to central and northern districts. The present study is the first systematic, mixed-method analysis of voting behavior in District Lakki Marwat for which it has been a persistent deviant from the overall provincial trends which helps to explore the boundary conditions of the usual models of voting behavior.

3. Theoretical Framework

The analysis is organised in four theoretical models.

Party identification. The Michigan model is one suggesting that voters develop a long-term and psychological sense of party attachment (usually through socialisation), and that this attachment is the source of party voting in subsequent elections (Campbell et al., 1960). Parental transmission is a major mechanism in determining such attachments (Jennings & Niemi, 1968), and social networks and media exposure have an influence on political attitudes (Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1995; Iyengar & Kinder, 1987). But in weakly institutionalized party systems, party labels are flexible and the degree of identification is rather shallow, and the applicability of the model in rural Pakistan is thus an empirical question.

Issue voting. Theories of rational-choice approach the vote as a means of securing desired policy outcomes. Downs (1957) proposed that voters vote for the party that is closest to him (the proximity logic), and directional theory suggests that parties that adopt strong positions on his side of an issue are rewarded by voters (Rabinowitz & Macdonald, 1989; Tomz & Van Houweling, 2008). Retrospective variants focus on assessing performance of the incumbent (Fiorina, 1981; Healy & Malhotra, 2013). Issues are also divided between parties by issue ownership, namely that voters link specific issues to specific parties, and judge the party that is the most competent to deal with the issue that is most salient to the campaign (Bélanger & Meguid, 2008; Budge & Farlie, 1983; Petrocik, 1996). In turn, campaigns can “ride the wave” of the issues that are salient to the public (Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1994) and the level of issue voting increases with an increase in party-system polarisation and in competitiveness of the elections (Lachat, 2011). A fundamental standard of a good democratic representation is issue congruence between voters and representatives (Thomassen & Schmitt, 1997; Powell, 2004).

Religious voting. The tradition of 'cleavage' considers religion one of the basic social cleavages that formed party systems (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967). The impact of religious affiliation and religiosity on the vote has also been identified in comparative studies on a number of party systems as a more important determinant than class (e.g., Rose & Urwin, 1969; Lijphart, 1979), and religion remains an important factor in voter's assessments of social and economic issues (e.g., Manza & Brooks, 1997). The religious cleavage is rather unusual, in a Muslim dominated Pakistan: it is not between religions, but between those who want to see a greater role for Islam in the public sphere (represented by demands for the introduction of sharia) and those who wish to see a more secular politics. Ullah (2014b) offers three reasons why political parties support religious parties: that people are genuinely pro-Shariah; that poverty and illiteracy are concentrated among the religious-party vote bank; and a rational exchange theory, where religious parties would maximise the expected benefits of the voters. Socio-psychological factors are also a precondition for support for religious right parties (Arzheimer & Carter, 2009).

Personality voting. Increasingly, literature in comparative studies relates to the personalization of

politics in which the voter's personality becomes more relevant to his political choice and the candidate's personality becomes more likely to attract voter interest (Caprara & Zimbardo, 2004; Caprara, Barbaranelli, & Zimbardo, 2002). Research on the Five-Factor Model of personality has been conducted on this relationship both sides (Digman, 1990; Mondak, 2010; Gerber, Huber, Doherty, & Dowling, 2011) and a “congruency principle” has been advanced that voters prefer candidates who in their opinion possess traits that they have themselves (Caprara & Zimbardo, 2004). Ideology is influenced by top down (elite) factors (Converse, 1964; Zaller & Feldman, 1992; Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009), bottom up (psychological) factors (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003) and a combination of both (dual process models, Duckitt & Sibley, 2010). Personalisation is further accentuated within the institutional set-up in Pakistan, where parties are dominated by families (Sharifs in the Pakistan Muslim League-N, Bhutto-Zardaris in the Pakistan Peoples Party, Mufti Mehmood family in the JUI-F) and in the present electoral system a candidate with a relatively small share of the vote can win a plurality seat; making elections more personality-centric and personalities more effective in connecting voters with parties (Waseem, 2006). This pattern of candidate-centered election was reinforced by the non-party elections of 1985 where only independent candidates, mostly from the landed aristocracy and business class, were allowed to run for office (Awan, 2016).

An analytical expectation is based on this framework and is conditional. In programmatic and organizationally dense parties, party identification and programmatic issue voting should prevail; in religious and dynastic (thin) parties, religious networks and personality of the candidate should take the vote. As a conservative, rural, kinship-based district, one party with an unusually strong grassroots organization, Lakki Marwat is a most-likely case for the simultaneous prevalence of religious and personality voting and the test is the district's long-term deviation from provincial patterns.

4. Data and Methods

The study is quantitative, analytical and comparative in design with triangulation of four sources of evidence.

A structured questionnaire was first given to voters of District Lakki Marwat before the 2018 General Elections and a total of 1122 (626 male, 55.8% and 496 female, 44.2%) usable questionnaires were collected. Random and purposive (non-random) sampling was used to recruit the respondents, both within the tehsils and in the union councils of the district. It included fifty-two items including demographic characteristics (gender, age, profession, monthly income, marital status, educational qualification, and geographic location in the irrigated and the arid zones of the district); turnout and vote choice in the 2002, 2008, 2013 and 2018 elections; and batteries of attitudinal items on party affiliation, candidate qualities, local issues, vote selling and female enfranchisement. The pivot variable was presented to ask why they voted in 2018 for their chosen party, which included ideology, good performance, Islamic system, job for the family, protection of Pakhtun rights, desire to change the system and “don't know”.

Second, an additional attitudinal module (N = 613, of which 364 were male and 249 female, with 333 in the cities and 280 in the countryside) explored attitudes towards the correct role of the ulema (religious scholars) and the success of religious parties in enacting Sharia (law) to allow for more nuanced measurement of religion as a voting factor.

Thirdly, in-depth semi-structured elite interviews were done with fifteen informants among whom former federal ministers, members of National Assembly (Anwar Saifullah Khan, Salim Saifullah Khan, Humayun Saifullah Khan, Naseer Muhammad Khan Maidad Khel, Colonel (R) Amirullah Khan), sitting members of provincial assembly (Munawar Khan, Anwar Hayat Khan, Hisham Inamullah Khan), former party officeholders, local government and ordinary citizens.

Fourth, the complete constituency results were available for the district's seats in the National Assembly and Provincial Assembly in the general elections of 1988, 1990, 1993, 2002, 2008, 2013 (including the

2013 by-election), and 2018 from Election Commission of Pakistan reports (ECP, 2013, 2018) and sources of election observation (FAFEN, 2013).

Survey responses were cross tabulated and Pearson chi-square tests were used to evaluate the statistical significance of association for all the demographic control variables at the $p < 0.05$ criteria. There are two restrictions that need to be considered. The sample is a district case study and the conclusions drawn from marginal distributions are not valid for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa as whole; and the partially purposive sampling design has resulted in the marginal distributions being descriptive of the sample obtained, and not necessarily accurate representations of the population studied. The central findings, however, have significant robustness in the consistent pattern of the survey results and the returns from the constituencies and the evidence from the interviews.

5. The Study Area: District Lakki Marwat

Lakki Marwat is located in south Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, bordered by Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu in the east, Tank in the south, Mianwali District of Punjab in the east and the former Frontier Region (F.R.) Lakki tribal belt in the west. It is a newly formed district from Bannu Division with an area of 3164 square kilometres on 1st July 1992 (Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 2017). The 2017 census counted 902,138 people with only 89,252 people (less than 10%) urban and 812,816 rural (Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, 2017). They are overwhelmingly of the Marwat tribe of the Pakhtuns, and there are some Bhattani. The district is divided into three tehsils: Lakki, Naurang and Ghazni Khel (newly created) and thirty-four union councils.

The district can be split into two geo-physically different parts, one being the western pakka (terra firma) with its irrigated land, using water brought down from Baran Dam by the Marwat Canal and from the Gambila River by the Civil Canal, and the other being the eastern shagga, a sandy, arid area on which nothing much could be grown beyond gram and wheat because of the unpredictable nature of rainfall. The differences between this ecological division do relate to differences in prosperity and, as the survey instrument acknowledged, this represents a meaningful axis of social stratification.

In elections, electorally it was a part of Bannu-Lakki Marwat seats of the National Assembly (NA-20, PF-61 and PF-62), then later on came under National Assembly (NA-27) and Provincial Assembly (PF-74, PF-75 and PF-76) in 2002 and later on in elections of 2018, it came under National Assembly (NA-36) and Provincial Assembly (PK-91, PK-92 and PK-93). In 2018 the district's registered electorate numbered 421,224 (236,162 men and 185,062 women), up from 330,274 registered voters in 2013 (FAFEN, 2013).

6. Electoral History of Lakki Marwat 1988-2018

But compile a district list of election results for the past 30 years and it is possible to identify two underlying features: firstly, a small number of family names at the forefront and secondly an ongoing process of consolidation of the influence of JUI-F.

1988-1993: The time of the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad and the Muslim Leagues. During the 1988 elections, all the seats of the area were won by the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) as Anwar Kamal Khan – belonging to the Meena Khel family – took the seat of PF-61 (with 18,640 votes) while Humayun Saifullah Khan won PF-62 (17,263 votes) and Anwar Saifullah Khan won the National Assembly seat NA-20 (37,572 votes), as opposed to the JUI-F's Maulvi Ahmad Jan (29,779 votes). Again in 1990, the IJI won the three seats, including that of Nazir Muhammad Khan of Begu Khel family from PF-61, Khan Mashal Khan from Begu Khel family from PF-61 and Salim Saifullah Khan from PF-62, who defeated the JUI-F's Ahmad Jan from NA-20 by 4,555 votes. The Muslim League factions split the loot in 1993: Anwar Kamal Khan (PML-N) held on to PF-61 against Humayun Saifullah Khan (PML-Junejo); Salim Saifullah Khan (PML-J) held on to PF-62 and Muhammad Kabir Khan (PML-N) of Ahmad Khel family held on to NA-20 with a razor thin margin of just 262 votes. The basic stuff of the district's politics is

already in evidence in this period: a group of the same families oppose every election, switching party affiliation as the mood strikes, while the JUI-F cultivates a strong but not yet winning religious vote.

2002: the MMA breakthrough. In the post-9/11 elections in October 2002, the MMA's Maulana Amanullah Khan even won the renumbered NA-27 with 65,938 votes (60.4%) compared to 41,171 votes (37.7%) for the PML-Q's Anwar Saifullah Khan, who ran on an explicitly anti-American campaign that mobilised the students of the madrassas (Naqvi, 2002). Interestingly, however, all three provincial seats were won by PML-N personalities hailing from established families, Zafarullah Khan (PK-74), Malak Imran Khan (PK-75) and Anwar Kamal Khan (PK-76), which shows that the religious wave at the national-seat level co-existed with personality voting at the provincial level.

2008: the personalist interregnum. The 2008 elections, which were boycotted and which took place when the Musharraf order was falling apart, saw the purest example of candidate-centred voting in the district's history. Humayun Saifullah Khan (PML-Q) secured NA-27 with 61,303 votes while Muhammad Khalid Raza Zakori of MMA got 52,315 votes. In all three provinces, independents swept the provincial seats: In both, in PK-74 (14,878) and in PK-75 (22,837), Anwar Saifullah Khan won them and in PK-76 Munawar Khan Advocate defeated PML-N's Anwar Kamal Khan (18,871). An independent winning two provincial seats at the same time as a party elected his brother to the national seat, shows that there is a strong personality vote than a party vote. It was in 2008 that the district started showing its distinctiveness from the province as the ANP emerged as the government in the province while the ANP's candidates in Lakki Marwat received hundreds of votes.

2013: When PTI wave swept through, JUI-F swept. When PTI swept Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in May 2013, the JUI-F swept Lakki Marwat. Maulana Fazlur Rehman secured victory in NA-27 with 84,531 votes, 28,456 ahead of the PML-N's Salim Saifullah Khan, who got 56,075 votes while the PTI's Colonel (R) Amirullah got 18,168 votes. As far as the provincial seats are concerned, the JUI-F had won all three provincial seats including vote of Anwar Hayat Khan in PK-74 (25,100), Malak Noor Saleem in PK-75 (29,900) and Munawar Khan Advocate who had won his seat in 2008 as an independent but this time was fielding for the JUI-F won in PK-76 (29,000). However, when Fazlur Rehman subsequently vacated his NA-27 seat after his victory in Dera Ismail Khan, the subsequent result of a by-election was to illustrate the opposite: help from the Saifullah brothers and some other bigwala families ensured a victory for the PTI's Colonel (R) Amirullah, who polled 63,922 votes against 56,948 for the JUI-F's Atta-ur-Rehman.

2018: divergence confirmed. The PTI were returned to power in July 2018 with an increased mandate in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, but the JUI-F's Maulana Muhammad Anwar Khan (religious cleric) and the administrator (muntazim) of a madrassa at Dara Pezu, won the re-numbered NA-36 with 91,396 votes, while PTI's Ishfaq Ahmad Khan secured 81,859 votes, with the Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (6,654), the PPP (3,086) and a collapsed PML-N (448) trailing behind. Provincially, the JUI-F's Munawar Khan has a comfortable lead in PK-91 (25242 votes to 21795) and Anwar Hayat Khan had a narrow victory in PK-93 (17114 to 16342) while the PTI's Dr Hisham Inamullah Khan held onto his provincial health minister's seat in PK-92 (38475 to 28450) in a clean sweep. The district thus had its third consecutive delegation that was dominated by JUI-F members, with PTI being re-elected in the province as a whole.

Table 1 Summarises the four most recent National Assembly contests.

Table 1. National Assembly results, Lakki Marwat (NA-27/NA-36), 2002–2018

Election	Winning party	Votes	Runner-up	Votes
2002	MMA	65,938	PML-Q	41,171
2008	PML-Q	61,303	MMA	52,315
2013	JUI-F	84,531	PML-N	56,075
2018	JUI-F	91,396	PTI	81,859

Source: Election Commission of Pakistan, General Elections Reports 2002–2018.

Two features of this record deserve emphasis. First, the JUI-F's national-seat vote grew monotonically across the period—from runner-up totals in the 1980s and 1990s, through the MMA victory of 2002 and near-miss of 2008, to outright majorities in 2013 and 2018—consistent with the gradual maturation of a religious network rather than a transient protest wave. Second, in every election the leading candidates on all sides were drawn from the same five or six families (the Saifullah brothers, Meena Khel, Maidad Khel, Ahmad Khel, Begu Khel, and the Malak family), whatever the party label; the parties changed, the personalities remained.

7. Religion as a Determinant of Voting Behaviour

7.1 The JUI-F and the infrastructure of religious mobilisation

Religion shapes socio-political attitudes throughout Pakhtun society, and religious parties' campaign rhetoric—promising the implementation of an Islamic system of governance, casting themselves as defenders of Islam, branding secular rivals as agents of foreign powers, and framing the vote for a religious party as a sacred duty—resonates with a substantial share of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa electorate. In Lakki Marwat the dominant vehicle of this appeal is the JUI-F. The party descends from the Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind (JUH), founded in 1919 by Deobandi scholars (Zaman, 2002; Pirzada, 2000); when the JUH split over the Pakistan movement, the pro-partition faction founded the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam under Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, who subsequently sat in the Constituent Assembly and played a significant role in the passage of the Objectives Resolution of 1949 (Ullah, 2014b). In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa the party was built by Maulana Abdul Haq and Mufti Mehmood; after the 1970 elections it returned seven members of the National Assembly and nine of the provincial assembly, and Mufti Mehmood became the province's chief minister—at the head, notably, of a coalition with the secular-nationalist National Awami Party, an early demonstration of the party's tactical flexibility. In the 1980s the party split over General Zia-ul-Haq's military government into the pro-regime JUI-S under Maulana Sami-ul-Haq and the oppositional JUI-F under Maulana Fazlur Rehman (BBC, 2002).

The JUI-F's decisive organisational innovation was its investment in religious education. Between 1980 and 2002 the number of madrassas affiliated with the JUI factions rose from roughly 1,840 to 7,000 (Nawab, 2007, as cited in Ullah, 2014b); graduates of these seminaries were recruited as imams of local mosques, whose Friday sermons (khutbas) relay the party's positions to voters at the most local level. This mosque-and-madrassa network is usefully read through the proximity logic of spatial theory: voters prefer candidates who are accessible and whose stated positions match their own demands (Downs, 1957; Tomz & Van Houweling, 2008), and the JUI-F's network places the party's intermediaries in physical and doctrinal proximity to virtually every rural voter. The network is supplemented by harder-edged tactics: religious edicts (fatwas) against rival parties are a recurrent campaign instrument, exemplified by Maulana Fazlur Rehman's May 2013 declaration in Dera Ismail Khan that voting for the PTI was haram and that its leader served a "Jewish lobby" (Express Tribune, 2013). Given the close attachment of Pakhtun communities to Islam (Jan, 2010), such appeals carry electoral weight.

At the provincial scale, however, religious parties' fortunes have fluctuated sharply. Table 2 reports the vote shares of the principal religious parties across the last four general elections. After the extraordinary MMA sweep of 2002—won amid the anti-American mobilisation that followed the invasion of Afghanistan (Naqvi, 2002; Kizilbash, 1988)—the religious vote receded province-wide, even as it consolidated in the southern districts. Before 2002, indeed, religious parties' national vote totals were modest: 1.76% in 1990, 6.75% in 1993, and 1.83% in 1997 (Warriach, 2002). Contemporary observers attributed the 2002 surge variously to anti-Americanism, to alienation from mainstream parties mired in debt, poverty, and dynastic wealth (Athar, 2002), to reaction against feudalism and the corruption of the secular parties (Idrees, 2002), and to socio-economic deprivation rather than foreign policy alone (Saddiqui, 2002). No single factor suffices; all contributed.

Table 2. Religious parties' percentage vote share, 2002–2018

Election	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (%)	National (%)
2002	73.2	54.3
2008	61.4	21.8
2013	25.6	28.9
2018	22.2	18.8

Source: Ullah (2014b, pp. 124–125); Election Commission of Pakistan (2018).

The difference between Table 2 and the district record of Table 1 lies in the crux of the puzzle: religious vote share in the province fell to its lowest point after 2008 while the absolute votes of the JUI-F reached its all-time high in 2018 in the province.

7.2 Survey evidence – why voters voted for their party in 2018

The survey's key question was to find out from respondents why they cast their ballots for the party they voted for in the 2018 elections. When considering the entire sample ($N = 1,122$), the most popular reason was “change the system” (29.9%), followed by the imposition of an Islamic system (17.7%), good performance (17.6%), ideology (13.8%), Pakhtuns' political rights (9.0%), “don't know” (9.4%), and jobs for the respondent's family (2.7%). At face value, these marginals substantiate that religious motivation—although it is not the highest figure district-wide—is one of the two top substantive motivations, and far outstrips ethnic-nationalist and clientelistic self-reports, which are tied for second place.

Their distribution, in addition, is patterned in accordance with social position. Chi-square tests revealed statistically significant associations between stated vote motivation and gender ($\chi^2 = 14.79$, $p = .022$), age ($\chi^2 = 54.12$, $p = .027$), profession ($\chi^2 = 78.62$, $p < .001$), monthly income ($\chi^2 = 67.13$, $p < .001$), educational qualification ($\chi^2 = 106.8$, $p < .001$), and geographic region ($\chi^2 = 91.52$, $p < .001$). There are several patterns that are of interest.

First, region: the Islamic-system motivation was the largest motivational category among the southern respondents (Lakki Marwat, Bannu, Tank: 110 of 382 or 9.8% of the total sample) while among the northern and the central respondents “change the system” was the predominant motivation (11.9% and 10.5% of the total sample respectively). This gradation is similar to the electoral geography: ever since 2002, the south has been a stronghold for the JUI-F.

Second, education and income: those who had primary, middle and matriculation level education and those in the lowest income band (less than Rs. Although the Islamic system was disproportionately cited by respondents with 10,000 per month or less, the MA/MSc respondents, in particular, disproportionately cited system change (modal category among MA/MSc respondents is 96 out of 268) and ideological attachment. Similarly, a significant number of illiterate respondents said that they voted along religious lines. Such gradients are similar to the ones that Ullah (2014b) had argued to be an effect of poverty and illiteracy on giving support to religious parties.

Third, the gender and age: both genders reported significant numbers of their votes going to the Islamic system (9.8% of males and 7.9% of females respectively), and the motivation cut across all seven age bands and was not just among old people—suggesting that religious voting in the district is being reproduced among younger age groups and not being lost as older people die out.

7.3 Religiosity with discrimination: ulema and the record of the religious parties

The supplementary module ($N = 613$) addressed two more specific issues: How should the role of the ulema be, and, to what extent have the religious parties actually been successful in implementing the Sharia? The responses show that, in many ways, the respondents were quite religious and that they

discriminated between what is "good" and "bad" religion.

When respondents were asked the question of what should be the role of the ulema; to confine themselves to interpretation and teaching of Islam, to get into politics or to do both, a majority (56.6%) opted for religious role only, 36.5% opted for a combined role and only 6.9% opted for a purely political role. Preference for the purely religious role was strongest among urban respondents (59.5% vs. 53.2% rural; $\chi^2 = 30.45$, $p < .001$), men (61.3% vs. 49.8% of women; $\chi^2 = 7.92$, $p = .019$), and the literate (57.1% vs. 55.8%; $\chi^2 = 7.20$, $p = .027$); conversely, rural respondents, women, the illiterate, and housewives were relatively more willing to see the ulema in politics. No relationship with profession was observed and this was not statistically significant ($\chi^2 = 10.59$, $p = .226$).

Religious parties' performance on the sharia score was not good: 54.0% declared that the parties failed to promulgate sharia "not at all," while another 20.9% responded that it was promulgated "only to a limited extent" and only 13.5% provided a positive response "to a greater extent." Scepticism was significantly stronger among urban respondents (59.8% "not at all" vs. 47.1% rural; $\chi^2 = 28.57$, $p < .001$), men (58.8% vs. 47.0%; $\chi^2 = 16.63$, $p = .001$), respondents over forty (61.0% vs. 49.9%; $\chi^2 = 8.26$, $p = .041$), businessmen and shopkeepers (61.6%; $\chi^2 = 22.71$, $p = .030$), higher-income respondents (62.2%; $\chi^2 = 16.53$, $p = .011$), and the literate (55.0%; $\chi^2 = 18.39$, $p < .001$).

Lastly, when asked about the question: Should there be only religious political parties in Pakistan? 32.3% agreed somewhat and 10.6% agreed strongly (42.9%) while 38.9% disagreed or strongly disagreed. Agreement was significantly associated with gender ($\chi^2 = 16.09$, $p = .003$), profession ($\chi^2 = 80.18$, $p < .001$), income, education ($\chi^2 = 106.8$, $p < .001$), and region ($\chi^2 = 114.7$, $p < .001$)—southern respondents were the most supportive (165 of 382 agreeing to some extent)—but not with age ($\chi^2 = 19.03$, $p = .750$). Among the respondents, those who were illiterate and who were in the lower income groups were the strongest supporters for exclusively religious party system and respondents with post-graduation education were the strongest opponents of it.

The composite picture is in a theory pedagogically instructive. It is not an undifferentiated enthusiasm that religion in Lakki Marwat: majorities would restrict ulema to pulpit and take the work of the religious parties in the legislature to be a failure. However, the electorate has been sending the JUI-F to elections after elections and the electorate in the south has been voting for an Islamic system. The explanation for this seemingly paradoxical situation is the mechanisms outlined above: the JUI-F's vote is not so much a judgement on the policy performance of JUI-F as much as a future religious pledge from a poor rural electorate, largely illiterate, who can be mobilised at will through the mosque-madrassa network and who have been reinforced by the comparative-cleavage dynamics that have been described in the literature (Rose & Urwin, 1969; Lijphart, 1979; Manza & Brooks, 1997). As pointed out by Rauf (2011) (cited in the general literature of Pakhtun religiosity) and Jan (2010), religious appeals are very effective in the Pakhtun strongholds of Islam like Lakki Marwat.

9. Clients and their Privileges

8.1 Social Darwinist theory of the 'fight for life' between dynastic families

Religion provides the mass base of JUI-F, the organisation of competition is dynastic. Downs (1957, p. 25) considers a party to be "a team of men seeking to control the governing apparatus by gaining office in a duly constituted election"; in developing democracies, the teams are controlled by certain men and families. Since 1988, there has been hardly any serious contender from other than these 5 families in Lakki Marwat: Saifullah family (Anwar, Salim and Humayun Saifullah Khan), Meena Khel family (late Anwar Kamal Khan, his brother Akhtar Munir Khan Marwat and his son Mansoor Kamal Khan), Maidad Khel family (Naseer Muhammad Khan), Ahmad Khel family (Muhammad Kabir Khan, Zafarullah Khan, Munawar Khan Advocate) and Begu Khel family (Khan Mashal Khan) and Malak family (Malak Noor Saleem). The history of elections in Section 6 can be traced in an almost clean sweep as offices of the houses have changed hands under different hues and hues—Saifullah brothers

as IJI in 1988-1990, then PML-J in 1993, PML-Q in 2002-2008, PPP and PML-N later, Munawar Khan as independent in 2008, JUI-F in 2013, MMA in 2018 and Anwar Kamal Khan as IJI, then PML-N. The cast of characters changes, personalities stay the same.

The Saifullah family is a case in point. Begum Kulsum Saifullah Khan's son Anwar Saifullah Khan, son-in-law of President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, was a federal minister for environment (1990-93), for petroleum (1994-96), a member of the Senate (1990-97), won two provincial seats in the election of 2008 and later presided the provincial organisation of the PPP. His brother Salim Saifullah Khan is chief (khan) of the Marwat tribe, a graduate of Carnegie Mellon university, and has served in various federal ministries including housing, commerce, petroleum and inter-provincial coordination, and has chaired the Senate's foreign relations committee and led a faction of the Pakistan Muslim League. The third brother Humayun Saifullah Khan was district nazim and National Assembly member (2008-13). The family's industrial wealth is the basis of an operation of provincial scale for patronage.

8.2 How personality voting works

There are three ways of trading family prominence for votes. Firstly, economic patronage. Most voters in the district are in the lower and middle income brackets and suffer from chronic economic insecurity; voting for an economically strong candidate gives them some hope of support and the testimony of interviews and surveys suggests that the Saifullah brothers' offering of jobs to many in the district in the areas of NA-27 and NA-36 ensures the durable support of entire beneficiary families. It is in its purest form, the rural clientelism of Wilder (1999).

The second is to be involved in the social life of the constituency, in Pakhtun language, gham-khadi—that is, the responsibilities of sorrow and joy. When politicians attend the funerals and weddings of ordinary families, it is known that they are giving the families a respect that directly translates into bloc support: meaning that a family's support is given when the politician goes to one family's funeral or wedding. It's locally said it was the extent of participation of both Khan brothers in the ceremony of the constituents which has ensured three successive wins in the three provincial elections (2008, 2013, 2018) for Munawar Khan Advocate.

The third is the 'personal-religious hybrid' as in the case of the JUI-F which secured a victory for the party with its winning candidate in 2018, Maulana Muhammad Anwar Khan, who is a madrassa administrator as well as a religious personality. More broadly, the comparative literature's congruency principle, whereby voters are more likely to vote for candidates who are perceived to share their own traits (Caprara & Zimbardo, 2004; Caprara et al., 2002), applies to Lakki Marwat in terms of registers of piety, tribal honour, and accessibility rather than any of the trait registers that have been used in Western survey research (Mondak, 2010; Gerber et al., 2011).

The quasi-experimental evidence of the impact of these personal networks comes from the 2013 by-election. During the general elections held on May, 2013, the PTI candidate Amirullah (Colonel) got 18,168 votes for NA-27; later, at the time of the by-election (after the resignation of Maulana Fazlur Rehman) the same candidate, then backed by Saifullah brothers and other dignitaries of the district, won by securing 63,922 votes. A candidate whose party and his name remained constant more than tripled his vote when he received the endorsement of the leading families: it's hard to see how this could be clearer evidence than in this district, that in this district it's not party that moves the median voter, it's notable endorsement.

Voting: Programmatic Rhetoric, Clientelistic Practice

9.1 The national problem agenda and its refraction on the local level

Pakistan's 2018 campaign was waged on a familiar national issue agenda – of terrorism, corruption, unemployment, shortages of energy, poverty, illiteracy and injustice (International Growth Services, 2017). Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has been the hardest hit province by the war on terror since 2001, with

tremendous social, economic and political impacts (Ahmad, 2010b) along with thousands of casualties. Respondents were asked to indicate what they believed was the primary problem in society, 27% credited terrorism, 10% corruption, 10% illiteracy, 8% poverty, 6% unemployment and 6% load-shedding; with a whopping 33% asserting that their locality had multiple issues from the listed problems.

Party strategy followed this agenda as issue-ownership and wave-riding theories (Petrocik, 1996; Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1994) suggest. The PTI's rhetoric was based on the theme of "change" and "Naya Pakistan", which attributed all the ills of the incumbent governments to misgovernance and vowed administrative change, which was given credibility because of the philanthropic aura surrounding the leader. The JUI-F vowed protection of Islam and implementation of Sharia. The Jamaat-e-Islami had put forth a reform programme in 29 points covering the issues of unemployment, feudalism and terrorism, lawlessness and education. The ANP's agenda emphasized militancy and provincial autonomy, however, the threats by Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan against its candidates paralysed its campaign and it did not get a chance to defend itself in the campaign (Khan, 2015). This competition for the issue, through the province as a whole, worked to the benefit of the PTI which had no competition for the issue of "change".

The result of the same competition in Lakki Marwat was exactly the opposite as the PTI change appeal took just one provincial seat and couldn't even take a single seat nationally. The survey data tell why. The most common motivation district-wide was "change the system" but this was found mostly in the demographic categories (graduates, postgraduates, government servants and the urban) where there is the lowest population density in a district that is more than ninety per cent rural, predominantly poor and significantly illiterate. The religious motivation was as strong as, or stronger than, the main categories that make up the district's real electorate.

9.2 Hyper local issues and votes available in the market

Basically, in the case of Lakki Marwat, the issue voting is at a much smaller level than at the level of the national manifesto. The district's poor crowded majority votes on how a resolution is reached in the immediate, household, issue – most importantly water and electricity. At election time, the constituents ask candidates to provide them with pressure pumps and transformers; and vote for the party or person who promises them the provision of the same - and the successful politicians do little more for the general welfare after that until the next election. This is Downs' (1957) instrumental sense of issue voting, with the "issue" being a private or club good, rather than a public policy, the place where issue voting turns into clientelism.

When taken to its extreme, the voting itself is a product. Respondents and interviewees cited an open market where parties/candidates buy votes from impoverished households prior to and on polling day on an individual basis, by kin group or by whole mohallah or village at rates that ranged from Rs. 500 to 1,000 per vote. A more complicated variant is a contingent contract: the candidate puts up money on his own as an assurance to the village which is returned if he wins election, but retained if he fails to be elected, and is then used to address the issue at hand in the village. This, combined with the results of the survey questions that ask which respondents' localities allow for vote selling, suggests that a non-trivial proportion of the electorate in the district is involved in electoral exchange rather than electoral choice, and a structural context in which programmatic appeals are structurally disadvantaged.

9.3 Challenges of Women's Empowerment

The survey also recorded the following gendered obstacles to electoral participation that underlie all the above: women have to journey far to reach polling stations; male interference at polling stations and the absence of separate female polling stations; lack of even rudimentary purdah facilities; ulema's prohibition of women's votes; polling staff's lack of cooperation; and, surprisingly, inter-party agreements to block women's voting. The integrity of the franchise of women, 185,062 out of 421,224

registered voters in the district in 2018, is directly linked to the results of the elections and is a subject of investigation in itself.

10. Discussion

The results may now be put back into the four theoretical models.

The Michigan concept of party identification (Campbell et al., 1960) has limited support. Stable attachments in Lakki Marwat are to persons, families and the religious network, with the same people at the helm of affairs in every election, a trend that includes the shocking results of the 2008 elections when independents won, and the by-election swings of 2013. There is a partial exception, however, in the case of the JUI-F, whose mosque-madrassa system is a mechanism of socialisation that leads to an 'enduring identification' but the object of identification is not only the party label but also the religious institution.

Programmatic issue voting (Downs, 1957; Petrocik, 1996; Lachat, 2011) is effective at the provincial level as it brought Khyber Pakhtunkhwa into the hands of the PTI twice, but is not effective at the district level where the demographic bearers of the "change" issue are limited and where "issues" have a hyper-local and clientelistic meaning. The issue of ownership of JUI-F is still alive in the inverted manner as the PTI has the ownership over change in the centre and north and similarly, the JUI-F has the ownership over the Islamic-system issue in the south.

The concept of religious voting (see Lipset & Rokkan, 1967; Lijphart, 1979) is best supported and with an important qualifier. It should be noted that the district's religious vote doesn't come as a reflexive expression since those who voted for the JUI-F judge mark the extent of Sharia failure and would restrict the ulema's role to religious matters only. Religious voting here is a socially entrenched practice, nourished by proximity in the voting network (Tomz & Van Houweling, 2008), bolstered by fatwa politics and, in line with Ullah's (2014b) socio-economic hypothesis, confined to the poor and unschooled, who constitute the majority in the district.

This is supported by personality voting (Caprara & Zimbardo, 2004; Waseem, 2006) and the results indicate that it is not one or the other, but the combination of the two that accounts for this district's deviation. When the two do, as in a by-election when a prominent family backs the religious party's rival, or a cleric-candidate on the JUI-F ticket, the figures change by tens of thousands. In the remaining six districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa during the period 2013-2018, the programmatic wave completely displaced both the mechanisms; and Lakki Marwat's social fabric was rural, poor, illiterate, tribally organized and filled with religious infrastructure of one party, which did not allow anything to take a grip.

The implications of these findings go beyond this case. They propose that the provincial or national units camouflage theoretically crucial differences; that the "decline of the religious vote" thesis since 2008 mistakenly identifies peripheries of consolidation as collapse; and that programmatic models of party systems need to be explicitly formulated as models of voting behaviour under particular social conditions (literacy, urbanisation, network density, marketisation of votes).

11. Conclusion

This article aimed to find out the reasons behind the consistent anti-KhP attitude of District Lakki Marwat during the general elections 2008, 2013 and 2018. It has found that the district's electoral behaviour is disciplined by both religious voting, done via the JUI-F's mosque and madrassa network and focussed on a poor, rural and largely illiterate electorate, and personality voting which revolves around a few dynastic families whose patronage, job provision and ritual involvement bring bloc voting irrespective of party label. There is issue voting, but this is done in a hyper-local, clientelistic way, even going so far as to buy votes; party identification per se is quite weak.

The study offers the first systematic account of voting behaviour in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa's southern districts, offers a district-level corrective to the province-level narratives of the decline of religious parties, and spells out the scope conditions under which programmatic electoral waves fail to penetrate. Its constraints suggest a research agenda: the partially purposive sampling suggests the need for replication (using probability sampling) and the barriers to female voting warrant a specific study; and some experimentation with Bannu, Tank, and Dera Ismail Khan is needed to determine if the Lakki Marwat configuration is a southern-belt syndrome or simply a district idiosyncrasy. With the electoral democracy in Pakistan maturing, the issue of programmatic politics will not be determined in the metropolitan centres where it is already a reality but in peripheral districts like Lakki Marwat where religion, family and the value of the vote still prevail.

References

- Ahmad, M. (2010b). Implications of the war on terror for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan. *Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies*, 3, 102–113.
- Ahmad, M. S. (2010a). *Electoral politics in NWFP, 1988–1999* (Doctoral dissertation). National Institute of Pakistan Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.
- Ahmed, M. (2004). *Faisalabad Division ki siyasat per biradarism kay asraat* (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). Department of Political Science and International Relations, Bahauddin Zakariya University, Multan.
- Ansolabehere, S., & Iyengar, S. (1994). Riding the wave and claiming ownership over issues: The joint effects of advertising and news coverage in campaigns. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 58(3), 335–357.
- Anwar, M. F. (2016). Role of biraderi in politics: A case study of voting behaviour in Jhok Bodo village, District Dera Ghazi Khan. *Pakistan Journal of History and Culture*, 37(2), 19–36.
- Arzheimer, K., & Carter, E. (2009). Christian religiosity and voting for West European radical right parties. *West European Politics*, 32(5), 985–1011.
- Athar, M. (2002, November). The rise of the religious right. *NewsLink*.
- Awan, M. W. (2016). Non-party elections and the personalisation of electoral politics in Pakistan. In *Electoral politics in Pakistan* [collected studies]. Lahore.
- Baxter, C., & Kennedy, C. H. (Eds.). (1998). *Pakistan 1997*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- BBC. (2002, October 7). Profile: Maulana Fazlur Rahman. *BBC News*.
- Bélanger, É., & Meguid, B. M. (2008). Issue salience, issue ownership, and issue-based vote choice. *Electoral Studies*, 27(3), 477–491.
- Budge, I., & Farlie, D. (1983). *Explaining and predicting elections: Issue effects and party strategies in twenty-three democracies*. London: Allen & Unwin.
- Campbell, A., Converse, P. E., Miller, W. E., & Stokes, D. E. (1960). *The American voter*. New York: Wiley.
- Caprara, G. V., Barbaranelli, C., & Zimbardo, P. G. (2002). When parsimony subdues distinctiveness: Simplified public perceptions of politicians' personality. *Political Psychology*, 23(1), 77–95.
- Caprara, G. V., & Zimbardo, P. G. (2004). Personalizing politics: A congruency model of political preference. *American Psychologist*, 59(7), 581–594.
- Converse, P. E. (1964). The nature of belief systems in mass publics. In D. E. Apter (Ed.), *Ideology and discontent* (pp. 206–261). New York: Free Press.

- Digman, J. M. (1990). Personality structure: Emergence of the five-factor model. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 41, 417–440.
- Downs, A. (1957). *An economic theory of democracy*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Duckitt, J., & Sibley, C. G. (2010). Personality, ideology, prejudice, and politics: A dual-process motivational model. *Journal of Personality*, 78(6), 1861–1894.
- Election Commission of Pakistan. (2013). *General Elections 2013 report*. Islamabad: ECP. Retrieved from <http://www.ecp.gov.pk>
- Election Commission of Pakistan. (2018). *General Elections 2018 report*. Islamabad: ECP. Retrieved from <http://www.ecp.gov.pk>
- Express Tribune. (2013, May 5). Political ‘fatwa’: Voting for PTI is haram, says Fazl. *The Express Tribune*.
- FAFEN. (2013). *Observation of General Elections 2013: Key findings and recommendations* (1st ed.). Islamabad: Free and Fair Election Network.
- Fiorina, M. P. (1981). *Retrospective voting in American national elections*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Gerber, A. S., Huber, G. A., Doherty, D., & Dowling, C. M. (2011). The Big Five personality traits in the political arena. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 14, 265–287.
- Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. (2017). *District profile: Lakki Marwat*. Peshawar: Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
- Haider, S. K. (2002). *Elections in Pakistan: National and provincial assembly results*. Lahore.
- Healy, A., & Malhotra, N. (2013). Retrospective voting reconsidered. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 16, 285–306.
- Huckfeldt, R., & Sprague, J. (1995). *Citizens, politics, and social communication: Information and influence in an election campaign*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Idrees, M. (2002, November). Commentary on the 2002 election results. *NewsLink*.
- International Growth Services. (2017). *Pakistan: Socio-economic issues survey*. Islamabad.
- Iyengar, S., & Kinder, D. R. (1987). *News that matters: Television and American opinion*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Jan, A. (2010). Contested Muslim space and religious identity among the Pakhtuns. In *Pakhtun identity and religiosity* [research studies]. Peshawar: University of Peshawar.
- Jennings, M. K., & Niemi, R. G. (1968). The transmission of political values from parent to child. *American Political Science Review*, 62(1), 169–184.
- Jost, J. T. (2006). The end of the end of ideology. *American Psychologist*, 61(7), 651–670.
- Jost, J. T., Federico, C. M., & Napier, J. L. (2009). Political ideology: Its structure, functions, and elective affinities. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 60, 307–337.
- Jost, J. T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A. W., & Sulloway, F. J. (2003). Political conservatism as motivated social cognition. *Psychological Bulletin*, 129(3), 339–375.
- Khan, H. (2009). *Constitutional and political history of Pakistan* (2nd ed.). Karachi: Oxford University Press.
- Khan, I. A. (1986). *Voting behaviour in rural NWFP*. Peshawar: Pakistan Academy of Rural

Development.

- Khan, M. S. (2015). Violence and voting behaviour: Student perceptions in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. *Liberal Arts and Social Sciences International Journal*.
- Kizilbash, H. H. (1988). Anti-Americanism in Pakistan. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 497(1), 58–67.
- Lachat, R. (2011). Electoral competitiveness and issue voting. *Political Behavior*, 33(4), 645–663.
- Lijphart, A. (1979). Religious vs. linguistic vs. class voting: The “crucial experiment” of comparing Belgium, Canada, South Africa, and Switzerland. *American Political Science Review*, 73(2), 442–458.
- Lipset, S. M., & Rokkan, S. (1967). Cleavage structures, party systems, and voter alignments: An introduction. In S. M. Lipset & S. Rokkan (Eds.), *Party systems and voter alignments: Cross-national perspectives* (pp. 1–64). New York: Free Press.
- Manza, J., & Brooks, C. (1997). The religious factor in U.S. presidential elections, 1960–1992. *American Journal of Sociology*, 103(1), 38–81.
- Mondak, J. J. (2010). *Personality and the foundations of political behavior*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Naqvi, M. B. (2002, October). The MMA surprise. *NewsLink*.
- Pakistan Bureau of Statistics. (2017). *Population census 2017: District Lakki Marwat*. Islamabad: PBS.
- Petrocik, J. R. (1996). Issue ownership in presidential elections, with a 1980 case study. *American Journal of Political Science*, 40(3), 825–850.
- Pirzada, S. A. S. (2000). *The politics of the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam Pakistan, 1971–1977*. Karachi: Oxford University Press.
- Powell, G. B., Jr. (2004). Political representation in comparative politics. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 7, 273–296.
- Rabinowitz, G., & Macdonald, S. E. (1989). A directional theory of issue voting. *American Political Science Review*, 83(1), 93–121.
- Rose, R., & Urwin, D. W. (1969). Social cohesion, political parties and strains in regimes. *Comparative Political Studies*, 2(1), 7–67.
- Saddiqui, K. (2002, November). Beyond anti-Americanism: The socio-economic roots of the MMA vote. *NewsLink*.
- Sayeed, K. B. (1967). *The political system of Pakistan*. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.
- Shafqat, S. (Ed.). (2007). *New perspectives on Pakistan: Visions for the future*. Karachi: Oxford University Press.
- Shah, H. (2013). *Voting behaviour in District Charsadda: A case study of General Elections 2008* (Unpublished M.Phil thesis). Department of Political Science, University of Peshawar.
- Thomassen, J., & Schmitt, H. (1997). Policy representation. *European Journal of Political Research*, 32(2), 165–184.
- Tomz, M., & Van Houweling, R. P. (2008). Candidate positioning and voter choice. *American Political Science Review*, 102(3), 303–318.
- Ullah, F. (2014a). *Voting behaviour in Pakistan: An analysis of partisan and floating voters in general elections 2013 in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa* (Doctoral dissertation). University of Peshawar,

Peshawar.

- Ullah, H. K. (2014b). *Vying for Allah's vote: Understanding Islamic parties, political violence, and extremism in Pakistan*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
- Warriach, S. (2002). The religious vote in Pakistan's elections, 1990–2002. *NewsLink*.
- Waseem, M. (1994). *The 1993 elections in Pakistan*. Lahore: Vanguard Books.
- Waseem, M. (2006). *Democratization in Pakistan: A study of the 2002 elections*. Karachi: Oxford University Press.
- Wilder, A. R. (1999). *The Pakistani voter: Electoral politics and voting behaviour in the Punjab*. Karachi: Oxford University Press.
- Zaller, J., & Feldman, S. (1992). A simple theory of the survey response: Answering questions versus revealing preferences. *American Journal of Political Science*, 36(3), 579–616.
- Zaman, M. Q. (2002). *The ulama in contemporary Islam: Custodians of change*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.